Critical Subjectivity in Algorave’s Post-Work Practices

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Abstract

Algorave is a global community dedicated to expanding the boundaries of algorithms and coding in the context of live electronic music. Through algorithms, Algorave members have discovered the power of altering music’s structure. In the face of a fully automated future, this article queries whether this power may be directed towards defying political, economic, ideological, or ethical systems. First, I present Algorave as an idiosyncratic environment of a post-work society. Second, I develop a critique of Kathi Weeks’ handling of the concept of subjectivity to question a post-work imaginary that comprises the subject. Third, I explain the pertinence of a critical subjectivity praxis for Algorave to enrich their post-work stance, whereby I suggest using their analytical lens on algorithms to prevent subjectivity from passing on to the post-human terrain. From here, I conclude that the subject of automation is the automated subject, and that a post-work society is not possible without overthrowing subjectivity. I ultimately caution the advocates of automation when pursuing post-work, for if automation manages to make subjectivity a part of algorithms with governmental impact, we will be—now and for good—automatically condemned to living as subjects, significantly reinforcing the basis of neoliberal work.

Keywords

Algorave, automation, subjectification, post-work, post-humanism, neoliberalism
Introduction

Algorave is a global community dedicated to expanding the boundaries of algorithms and coding in the context of live electronic music. By “live”, Algorave members imply not only live performance but also live made and improvised. As a movement, their core guidelines are: “exposing algorithmic processes, staying wary of institutions, collapsing hierarchies, respect for other communities, and diversity in line-ups and audiences” (Resident Advisor, 2019, n.p.). As observed by Alex McLean, the musician and researcher who coined the term ‘Algorave’, the people involved in the movement are developing and nourishing a new language. With this language at the centre, they advance an ideology that—overlooking the digital divide—defends inclusion and operates under open-source practices. The requirements to get familiarized with and learn about the platforms and tools that they use, as well as the coding knowledge required to take part in the development of the language (McLean, as qtd in Resident Advisor, 2019), are limited to electricity and a computer with internet connection.

For instance, when discussing *TidalCycles*, a software that McLean crafted to make algorithmically generated music and visuals, he explains:

> TidalCycles is free. But free is not just about being able to download it but also having the freedom to share it with others...Code is about language, if you don’t share language it doesn’t have the same meaning, it doesn’t change. [This is] a political act...The sort of extreme of sharing everything you’re doing...You are kind of sharing almost every keypress with the world, and each keypress has the possibility of doing something new. So, it’s kind of pushing capitalism to its limits and breaking those limits. (McLean, as qtd in Resident Advisor, 2019, n.p.)

During Algorave events, the codes generating and changing the music are exhibited through projectors. Beyond the distinctive aesthetical identity this produces, and in conjunction with Algorave’s free knowledge and online open-source practices, the intention is that anyone would be able “to look at the contents of those algorithms and understand what is it that they’re actually doing” (Bell, as qtd in Resident Advisor, 2019, n.p.). Hence, the idea is to comprehend how algorithms unfold and “the effects they are having on our society on a larger scale” (n.p.).

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1 It is worth acknowledging Algorave’s cofounders’ positionality straight ahead: McLean and Collins are both men, white, European academics, and researchers. The first is a post-doc at the Deutsches Museum (McLean, Fanfani, & Harlizius-Klück, 2018), and the second is a professor at Durham University. That their subjectivities were socially shaped in certain privileged ways was crucial for them to develop and implement Algorave.

2 There is a free, two-month online course available at [https://club.tidalcycles.org/c/course/14?order=created&ascending=true](https://club.tidalcycles.org/c/course/14?order=created&ascending=true) taught my McLean himself, where apprentices will learn about coding and *TidalCycles* in full.
people creating the software algorithms and the people making the music” (Algorave, n.d., para 1). In so doing, they use the compositional power that they discovered in algorithms to change “the whole structure of the music” (Bell, as qtd in Resident Advisor, 2019, n.p.) and alter the societal structures in which electronic music takes part. Relatedly, by emphasizing composing at the moment with live-coding platforms, Algorave waives the recording and publishing steps, which, in other contexts, are quintessential to bridging the access gap between musicians and consumers. Indeed, Algorave contributes to the independence and autonomy of electronic music artists in an industry primordially driven by economic interests.

As the below pages will demonstrate, Algorave’s political discourse speaks to the post-work debate, which includes anti-capitalist, autonomist, and feminist theories that focus on liberation from work as opposed to a humanist reading of Marx, such as Erich Fromm’s (2014), which supports the liberation of work (Ferguson, Hennessy, & Nagel, 2019). The notion of post-work will be used in this article according to Srnicek & Williams’s (2016) development of the term, as presented in the subsequent section. The following discussion explores whether the power within algorithms to alter music’s structure can also be used by applying post-work and critical subjectivity practices to defy political, economic, ideological, and ethical structures, such as those of work and subjectivity. Hence, the ensuing arguments and reflections seek to find a voice in the academic conversation around Algorave politics, with the intent of supporting its members in finding pathways for using their political power in perhaps more efficient and poignant ways.

My analysis is divided into three parts. First, I present Algorave as a potentially idiosyncratic environment representative of a post-work society that has achieved full automation and thus contributes to diminishing the work ethic. This will serve as an attempt to respond to the following question posed by Srnicek and Williams (2016): What might the undertaking of a post-work world actually look like? (p. 107). By the end of this section, I consider a couple of Algorave’s shortcomings when regarded as a post-work community, including a gender deficit that they face (Armitage, 2018), whereby I draw attention to, and problematize, coding as a gendered language. Subsequently, I will warn the ideological and political advocates of automation of Algorave’s likeliness to propagate gender imbalances.

Second, I address the articulated history between work and subjectivity and the inconsistency in how Kathi Weeks—a professor and director of graduate studies in Gender, Sexuality and Feminist Studies at Duke University—deals with the concept of subjectivity in her book *The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics and Postwork Imaginaries*. I do this by illustrating—in her terms—the production of the subject at work and how the labour-related demands she envisions—such as the Universal Basic Income (UBI)—irrevocably involve a demanding subject. This discrepancy turns even more prominent, I reveal, when the theorist presents the benefits of such demands in subjective terms, i.e., self valorization, freedom, the fulfilment of pleasures, and desire expansion. In short, Weeks justifies post-work politics based on subjectivity, which I position as the backbone of neoliberal work.

Now, it is important to note that my understanding of subjectivity is influenced by Cartesian thought and its view that the subject relies on cognition and the human relation to truth (Chertkova, 2018). Since “any amount of doubt simply reiterates the truth that I, as a thinking thing, exist” (Atkins, 2005, p. 8), Descartes presents subjectivity as “the only guaranteed reality” (Chertkova, 2018, p. 43) and defines the subject as “a thinking thing…that doubts, that understands, that affirms, that denies, that wishes to do this and does not wish to do that, and also that imagines and perceives by the senses” (Descartes, 2008, p. 20). In this way, I take subjectivity as our own representation of ourselves, from which we relate to everything and
expressly, ourselves. As a contemporary examination of Nietzsche’s (2002) ideas on the subject suggests, this internal relationship of subjectivity is organized through power in its distinction between “the one who commands and the one who obeys” (p. 19). As he also notes, “the synthetic concept of the ‘I’ [incites] the habit of ignoring and deceiving ourselves about the [former] duality” (p. 19). From this perspective, I engage subjectivity as a central mechanism of neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism is a “phase in the development of the capitalist mode of production” (Buchanan, 2010, p. 326), understood as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). This political doctrine, which came to the surface in the mid-1970s, campaigns for “keeping interest rates...[and] inflation low” (Buchanan, 2010, p. 326), as well as “a modest welfare state” (Vallier, 2021, para 1). Neoliberalism entails many issues, and scholars across myriad fields of study have highlighted how free-market conditions under neoliberalism spark inequality and exclusion, particularly when it comes to goods and services that are essential to human life, such as potable water, food, or access to healthcare. For this reason, critical scholarship has proffered that it is vital to think of neoliberalism as a way of structuring society and a specific arrangement of power (Buchanan, 2010).

Under neoliberalism, the tacit power Nietzsche (2002) referred to in our relationship with ourselves becomes intermingled with the idea of freedom, and subjectivity is established as a critical governmental device. It is Bröckling (2015) who signals that the neoliberal political agenda included the production of a new (working) subject as one of its cornerstones. This is apparent from the final inform of the Bavarian and Sajonian commission for Future Matters of 1997, which declared that to manufacture productive people with an entrepreneurial nature, it is necessary to reinforce the population’s will with science and media, on top of politics (Kommission für Zukunftsfragen Bayern – Sachs, 1997, as cited in Bröckling, 2015, p. 20). Thus, in this setting, a subject is anyone whose representation of themselves is, to any extent, mediated or influenced by production/consumption processes under a neoliberal, capitalist framework. But, more than anything, the subject is subject to itself. And because the subject is a product of modern and capitalist relations, capitalism and the subject’s ideology are always the same.

The intimate connection between work and subjectivity will make it possible to question a post-work imaginary that comprises the subject, particularly if subjectivity, and thus the current concept of work, seep through algorithmic codes, risking further perpetration and finding their way into the post-human sphere. In agreement with Reeve’s (2016) idea that post-humanism “does not imply an end to being human, [but] a rejection of humanist principles, in particular that of the essentialist subject, and a recognition that human/nonhuman distinctions have become inoperative” (p. 161), I consider the promise of post-humanism to be transcendence of the subject and subjectivity, albeit in a soteriological and mystical sense. Such loosing-of-the-I, as I conceive it, entails fulfilment of a selfless perspective—probably via ‘spiritual’ technologies—which is materialized through decisions, actions, and relations. Thus, from this perspective, inviting the subject to join post-humanism would not only result in a paradox invigorating the state of affairs regarding work and human ‘life,’ but also in the most uncomfortable position to envision an embodied dissolution of the subject.

Accordingly, the third and last part of this article will tackle this post-work issue within the context of Algorave, highlighting the platform’s expedient position to challenge subjectivity’s centrality, and implement critical subjectivity practices that acknowledge “the conditions that structured that subjectivity in the first place and [recognize that] such conditions will also
dominate our forms of art” (Reeve, 2016, p. 159) unless the right strategies for overcoming them are found and employed.

**Algorave as a post-work community**

Srnicek and Williams (2016) propose that a post-work society must be built “on the basis of fully automating the economy, reducing the working week, implementing a universal basic income, and achieving a cultural shift in the understanding of work” (p. 108). The factual power of these demands relies on their integrated and coordinated application, whereby any movement towards a post-work world would be, at least partially, activated by time and economic resources that would enable humanity to pursue a more creative, reflective, and equitable society.

Referring to a universal or unconditional basic income, van Parijs (2013) draws a link to the refusal of work, as he writes that it “is about the power to say yes to activities that are poorly paid or not paid at all, but are nonetheless attractive either in themselves or because of the training and the contacts they provide” (p. 174). Hence, he says, by refusing work and adopting a UBI, we could construe more just societies and methodically upgrade labour conditions, which, in turn, would upgrade the conditions of life. For instance, under capitalism, the arts have always been at a disadvantage when it comes to the labour market and sufficient remuneration. This has continued to be the case during the era of neoliberalism. In turn, countless people have been dismayed from pursuing more creative and imaginative careers, which harms, not only the individuals themselves, but the overall artistic outcome of our societies. Prioritizing creativity requires, as Costa and James (1973) declare, “having time, and ‘to have time’ means to work less” (as qtd in Weeks, 2011, p. 126). Hence, the UBI and refusing work is one way to mitigate the social disadvantage of the arts.

**Refusing work and diminishing its ethos**

Weeks (2011) interestingly notes that one of the decisive repercussions of refusing domestic work is its invitation to scrutinize work’s ethics and elementary configurations (p. 125). Refusing to be paid for something that people in a capitalist society typically would be, as Algorave’s McLean does, bolsters the critiques concerning the structures and ethics around work. This is in line with Weeks’ statement that “the refusal of work is not a rejection of productive activity per se, but rather a refusal of central elements of the wage relation and those discourses that encourage our consent to the modes of work that it imposes” (p. 124).

Weeks (2011) further brings attention to the 1970s feminist device of wages for housework, which saw its origins in the domestic labour debate at the time. Marxist and feminist theorists interested in formulating perspectives around “the political economy of women’s household labour” (p. 118) extensively promoted the dialogue. According to Weeks, wages for housework is the least traditional outcome that emerged from the overall debate (p. 119). Her wish to revitalize its discussion is partially explained by her view that, when reconfigured, it can function as a present-day request for UBI since both strategies share the demands for more money and less work (p. 113-14).

If we conceptualized the wages for housework demand as a perspective, as Weeks (2011) does, and the practice of non-remunerated work as a political act, it is possible to understand how refusing money in exchange for work is prone to becoming a discourse. Emerging as the demand of wages for housework, such a discourse “could function as a force of demystification, an instrument of denaturalization, and a tool of cognitive mapping” (p. 129). The provocation of the free-work discourse, similar to the feminist demand, serves to evoke “subversive commitments, collective formations and political hopes” (p. 131). Indeed, the mobilization of wages for housework was not concerned with wages per se but rather with the power that could be achieved through demanding them (p. 133). It is here that we can identify a commonality with UBI, as what Weeks observes regarding the latter could easily apply to the former. This is
highlighted when she writes: “it is the ethics of the demand that often seem to generate more discomfort—specifically, over the way the demand is seen to denigrate the work ethic and challenge ideas of social reciprocity that have been so firmly attached to the ideal of the labor contract” (p. 146).

Regarding Algorave, refusing an income for a product that thousands of users operate (Resident Advisor, 2019) has a similar derogatory effect on work ethic. Further, consider how their platform speaks to how claiming latent kinds of power is helpful for subverting structures. However, contrary to the demands for housework wages and UBI, which stand for “more time and more money” (Weeks, 2011, p. 135), it appears that part of the underlying discourse of the open-source practice of Algorave is more time—to prioritize creativity—but less money. By acknowledging that open-source practices do not always assume an anti-capitalist or non-monetary agenda per se, we can start to consider how Algorave’s members are building power from within as opposed to submitting to external capitalist standards.

**Automation**

To continue with the analysis of Algorave as a post-work environment, I will now turn to the subject of automation. The automation movement believes that machines will eventually satisfy all demands for goods and services and thus free humanity of the obligation to do so (Srnicek & Williams 2016, p. 109). The tendency towards automation is gaining traction worldwide. Morris-Suzuki (1997) noted that “while the industrial sector employed 1,000 robots in 1970, today it uses over 1.6 million robots” (as qtd in Srnicek & Williams, 2016, p. 110). More significantly, however, the innovative form of automation founded upon algorithmic developments and improvements circumscribes all economy phases. Today, all mechanical and non-mechanical labour is susceptible to automation (p. 110-11).

In this direction, Berardi (2014) observes that, while robots are rapidly taking over ‘human’ tasks, such as language, memory, and imagination, human learning is increasingly relegated to mechanized enunciation. For example, think of the musician coding behind a laptop who does not know the exact effects and outcomes of modifying an algorithm during a live event and improvised performance. Not only does this exercise serves as an example of how automation translates intellectual processes into algorithmic operations (Berardi, 2014, p. 1), but it registers with Berardi’s theory on semiocapital, which asserts that, by capturing and subsuming cognitive activity, semiocapital valorises and accumulates “signs (semia) as economic assets” (p. 1).

The notion of semiocapital opens up space to critique Algorave, and while I will explain this in more depth below, for now, I want to posit the question of creativity in the semiocapital setting. On the one hand, one could agree with Berardi, as well as Srnicek and Williams, that a fully automated future, in which art jobs are undertaken by machines and the production of the new is delegated to self-sustainable algorithms, would take away the ‘burden’ of creativity from humans and allow them to simply enjoy the art. On the other hand, however, it is imperative to think of creativity as an anthropological category. What would become of a world where the production of the new is automatized, improvised, and even randomized? “The cognitive mutation that we are talking about”, Berardi affirms, “is going to dissolve the historical relation between consciousness, politics, and freedom” (p. 3). This means that those historical understandings of what has been regarded as voluntary choices will now be supplemented by arrays of algorithmic functions (p. 3). However, as I read it, Berardi’s point is that such robotized logical successions will simultaneously automatize subjectivity within a system designed to make voluntary choices.

Consequently, “cognitive automation [can be viewed as] the technology for injecting determinism into the human sphere” (Berardi, 2014, p. 2), and specifically around the concept of subjectivity. If subjects perform
automation—and because eluding subjectivity seems preposterous today—algorithms will contain and reproduce subjectivity through their incessant decision-making. Such a possibility illustrates the danger associated with automation, as it may allow for the reproduction of constructs that stem from historical ideologies, economic formations, and governmental structures, as is the case with subjectivity for neo-liberalism. In the succeeding section, I will elaborate on said systems of subject formation.

To succinctly reflect on the linguistic issue of automation, I should cite MGI’s assertion that approximately 110 to 140 million cognitive jobs will be eradicated globally before 2025 (McKinsey Global Institute, 2013, p. 40). Several leaders of the Algorave movement are aware of this prediction and ask themselves: “One question is what to do with all the software engineers, if their jobs were to disappear” (McLean, Fanfani, & Harzlizius-Kluck, 2018, p. 25). Nowadays, human-based programming is giving way to algorithmic and data-based dictation (p. 24). Hence, an even more interesting question these changes pose is what will happen with all the programming languages (p. 25) once humans are removed from the process of creating and nourishing them? From the above queries, it is possible to consider that, despite finding Srnicek and Williams’s (2016) call for full automation (p. 112) appealing, the proposal requires further consideration.

**Universal basic income**

As mentioned before, Srnicek and Williams’s (2016) proposal also entails the implementation of UBI, which van Parijs (1992) defines as “an income paid unconditionally to individuals regardless of their family or household relationships, regardless of other incomes, and regardless of their past, present, or future employment status” (p. 3). Different authors (Srnicek & Williams, 2016; Weeks, 2011) agree that income should be sufficient, unconditional, and continuous for UBI to be meaningful. Srnicek and Williams specify that UBI must not be regarded as a substitute to the welfare state but rather as complementary. Further, Weeks (2011) highlights that UBI must be large enough so that waged work remains an option but is no longer compulsory (p. 138). The above theorists underline the importance for UBI to acknowledge the economic function of social reproduction and non-monetary or non-quantifiable contributions to society which, as I have demonstrated, would be relevant for Algorave. Lastly, UBI is also helpful when thinking of remuneration in terms of need instead of the perceived “ability” to acquire and apply various skillsets considered relevant to succeed at work and within the capitalist labour market (Srnicek & Williams, 2016, p. 122).

To sum things up, the demand for UBI has a twofold function: as much as it serves to critique the current wealth distribution method in our societies, it also, and just as importantly, proposes a solution to decrease dependency on work (Weeks, 2011, p. 143). As I have mentioned, either refusing or reducing work should stimulate projects like Algorave. One could even argue that Algorave works as the very platform that Berardi (2014) envisions when he suggests that we should focus on the creation of a platform (social, cultural, institutional, artistic, neuroengineering) for the self-organization of the general intellect and the recomposition of the networked activity of millions of cognitive workers worldwide, who must get reacquainted with their social, erotic, and poetic body. We must to walk this territory where technology meets epistemology, psychopathology meets poetry, and neurobiology meets cultural evolution (p. 8).

The proposal for UBI complements a post-work society as it is a rare privilege to choose not to work (Srnicek & Williams, 2016, p. 120). If UBI were implemented, this rare privilege would become democratized, resulting in some capital and political power being redistributed, thus benefiting the largest part of the population. In Algorave, much of the work involved is voluntary, which is not an uncommon practice
among the arts. Indeed, plenty of the underground art and music we currently enjoy comprises voluntary work and DIY (i.e., do it yourself) practices. This confirms that capitalism’s coercion to work actively obtrudes and stagnates the arts’ development. What progress could we have experienced by now if not constrained by neoliberalism? Which developments of the arts would we encounter in a post-work society? Acknowledging the UBI’s “demand as not merely a policy proposal but a perspective and a provocation, may result in] a pedagogical practice that entails a critical analysis of the present and an imagination of a different future” (Weeks, 2011, p. 147). I delineate that it ‘may result in’, because as Baker (2019) has cautioned, UBI has become a broad concept with diverse connotations and nuances used by both left-wing and right-wing adherents. Hence, to avoid “the dream of unalienated life [which] could cause some to endorse policies that will lead to new forms of alienation and exploitation” (p. 1), it is also necessary to consider the more comprehensive social arrangement that contextualizes specific UBI proposals.

**Summary and tension points**

Considering the above observations, it is possible to argue that Algorave meticulously and directly tackles two of the touchstones considered in Srnicek and Williams’s integral proposal of the refusal of work: automation and the diminishment of the work ethic. Simultaneously, the other two elements, the reduction of the working week and the implementation of a UBI, can easily be related and potentiate the movement’s political perspective. As I have revealed, automation is a constitutive aspect of Algorave’s artistic techniques, and some of its members are active contributors to the debate of work, automation, and its confronting junctures with language. To my knowledge, Algorave has not collectively addressed the aspects of reducing the working week and UBI. However, I made explicit some benefits that they could obtain if such politics came into effect (like an indirect, economic retribution for non-quantifiable contributions to society, such as the production and nourishing of a new language), in addition to illustrating the possible connections between reducing work mandates/implementing UBI and Algorave’s free-work and open-source procedures. Finally, I also framed these practices as the discursive materialization of a perspective that supports the diminishment of neoliberalism’s work ethic. This, I posit, is enough to think of Algorave as a post-work community while also revealing the potential to develop the platform accordingly—if their members were interested in furthering such possibility.

Until now, I have focused on Algorave’s strengths concerning a post-work imaginary. Nonetheless, it is also essential to mention some shortcomings that require attention from within the community. I will start by referring to one that significantly intertwines with the possibility of an automated future and resonates with a larger phenomenon that Weeks (2011) calls the production of gender at work (p. 9), which can also be understood as the gendering of technology. As “Maureen McNeil has long argued, technology has always been bound up in and as a gender relationship” (Armitage, 2018, p. 33), and coding is no exception to this (p. 35). Men—notoriously white—have mostly developed programming languages, and “although women are using live coding languages to develop their musical practice, they are still finding themselves on the ‘receiving end’ of a technology” (Armitage, 2018, p. 43). Armitage’s critique that little effort has been put into backing up women to advance their own languages, or “access…the power to signify” (Haraway, 1991, p. 175), with the subsequent suggestion “that a language developed by women would act as the next significant cornerstone in further feminising the [A]lgorave scene” (Armitage, 2018, p. 43), incites the following realization: that because of the current state of gender imbalances in technological environments, it is likely that such imbalances will be coded and perpetuated into an automated future and, by extension, post-humanist landscapes. In this spirit, automation advocates should heed this warning, ensuring that
existing gender imbalances are not further conveyed and reproduced. Donna Haraway’s persuasive *Cyborg Manifesto* (1991) offers a political guide for how women in Algorave could reclaim the digital language. According to the manifesto, the biologist would encourage them to employ coding or cyborg writing to seize “the tools to mark the world that marked them as other” (p. 175). Such tools “are often stories, retold stories, versions that reverse and displace the hierarchical dualisms of naturalized identities” (p. 175). And let us not forget that aside from coding being a linguistic praxis, there is also a narrative potential in music compositions and performances. Haraway would inculcate this potential given that “feminist cyborg stories have the task of recoding communication and intelligence to subvert command and control” (p. 175). Thus, this might be another avenue that Algorave can interfere with and, in so doing, alter society’s established political and ideological structures.

An additional concern with the dynamics of Algorave relates to Berardi’s (2014) point on semiocapital, which helps to conceptualize the financial contributions and valorisation that Algorave produces through the constant nourishment of their language. When juxtaposing this with the inextricable relationship between society and language, and with Negri’s (1996) remark that “productive labor is...that which reproduces society” (p. 157), we arrive at the following interrogation: Who is deriving the economic benefits from the semiocapitalist labour of those involved in Algorave? This question is important given that their precarious working conditions could exemplify “the feminization of work” (Haraway, 1991, p. 168)—to borrow Haraway’s terms—or a progressive form of unemployment involving unpaid work.

Finally, I wish to outline my central worry regarding the relationship between Algorave and a post-work imaginary and make this the focus of the rest of my article. When expounding on the ethical burden towards implementing UBI, Srnicek and Williams (2016) state that work is immensely entrenched with our own identities (p. 123). Further, Weeks (2011) explicates that the UBI demand “invites the expansion of our [subjective] needs and desires” (p. 146). While I wholeheartedly back up her intention of contemplating humanity beyond the bounds of work, a significant problem, and contradiction, arises when she presents UBI’s gains in subjective terms. As various theorists have suggested (Bröckling, 2015; Dardot & Laval, 2014), subjectivity is work. Further, together with Restrepo, I have affirmed that, in the current landscape, work does not only need but depends on subjectivity (2018). Thus, it is puzzling to have this idea surfacing in Weeks’ (2011) exposition as the “dependence on independence” (p. 56). My call here is to be more attentive when justifying labour-related demands, such as UBI, through subjectivity.

**A post-work imaginary for the subject?**

Reflecting on subjectivity will provide an entirely different outlook on the issues already been discussed within this paper. Art, mediated by expression, is unavoidably subjective, and subjectivity is the perfect example of modern productive relations (Bröckling 2015). I believe it is in this direction that, for example, the Google Empire is “aiming at the systematic fabrication of automated subjectivity” (Berardi, 2014, p. 5). For these reasons, within the current neoliberal state, “overcoming the work ethic will require us overcoming ourselves” (Srnicek & Williams, 2016, p. 125). So, when concerning work—but not exclusively—we are the problem that we are trying to overcome (Hoyos Lozano & Muñoz Restrepo, 2018).

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3 As a matter of citational politics, I should mention that Haraway was recently called out by Katherine McKittirick for her anti-blackness in the following tweet: https://twitter.com/demonicground/status/1370462540036198402. Accordingly, I wish to clarify that this piece was developed beforehand and that it is not possible for me to accommodate the shortcomings of academia so immediately. If the piece had been written after the tweet, this section would have been revised, and Haraway altered out.
Work and subjectivity: An articulated history

So far, I have only touched on a couple of nodes in the relationship between work and subjectivity. I wish to begin the second part of this article by elaborating on the abovementioned problem outlined by Williams and Srnicek (2016), i.e., that work is “deeply ingrained into our very identity” (p. 123). Or, in the words of Weeks (n.d.): “work has come to be driven into our identity, portrayed as the only means for true self-fulfilment” (as qtd in Srnicek & Williams, 2016, p. 124-25). In this expansion, I will concentrate on Weeks’ thoughts on the matter to expose the inconsistency of designing a post-work society comprehending subjectivity.

Throughout the second half of the 20th century, philosophers like Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and Michel Foucault had a massive impact on how psychology’s power started to be thought of in different contexts. Because of this landmark, vital effects of the post-industrial work ethic became apparent. For instance, Rose (1999) noted the crucial role that psychology’s knowledge production played in making workers governable subjects (p. 56). In a similar vein, Foucault (1996) analyses power practices, such as the control of time and the body, which are enacted within disciplinary institutions, and are pivotal to subjectification processes. Moulier-Boutang (2006) added that such power practices should not solely be considered in relation to wage earners and the indicated institutions, but rather, in relation to every subordinate worker and institution participating in its reproduction. This supplement to Foucault’s well-known remarks insinuates that the capitalist subject is the subject per se (Hoyos Lozano & Muñoz Restrepo, 2018).

It seems clear that Weeks (2011) is also aware of the relationship between work and subjectivity. In this respect, her concern for the subject, judging by her extensive development, is one of the lead ideas throughout her book’s introduction and first few chapters. Partly, she works through the overlaps between capitalism and subjectification by examining the repercussions of the Protestant work ethic. The author adduces, for example, that the work ethic “is an individualizing discourse” (p. 52), which gives “advice not just about how to behave but also about who to be” (p. 54). The prescription of this ethic:

is not merely to induce a set of beliefs or instigate a series of acts but also to produce a self that strives continually toward those beliefs and acts. This involves the cultivation of habits, the internalization of routines, the incitement of desires, and the adjustment of hopes, all to guarantee a subject’s adequacy to the lifetime demands of work. (p. 54)

Building on her discussions about the Protestant ethic, Weeks (2011) resolves that an established work ethic secures vital amounts of disposal, dedication, and subjective investment (p. 70), and with good reason, as production processes also produce a subject for its resulting commodities (p. 50). Hence, the subject’s production is localized—halfway at least—in the industries, offices, and workplaces. Putting this idea into concrete form, Weeks declares that “work produces not just economic goods and services but also social and political subjects. In other words, the wage relation generates not just income and capital, but disciplined individuals, governable subjects, worthy citizens and responsible family members” (p. 8).

In a second moment of the articulated history of work and subjectivity, particularly relating to the new forms of digital work in Algorave, the subjectification of work develops into the work of subjectification (Bröckling, 2015, p. 63). From capitalism’s inception, there has been an intention to fuse the management’s agenda with the workers’ abilities and resolve to pour them into working action (Viteles, 1932, as cited in Pulido, 2015). Dardot and Laval (2014) consider this process completed with the “practices for manufacturing and managing the new subject”, who—in line with the previously cited inform from the Bavarian and Sajonian commission for
Future Matters of 1997—is expected to “work for enterprises as if they were working for themselves” (p. 260). This, they continue, subsequently “abolishes any sense of alienation and even any distance between the individuals and the enterprises employing them” (p. 260). As a result, workers do not only obey but find themselves wanting to do so (Pulido, 2011).

Observations of this kind led Dardot and Laval (2014) to conclude that our lives are increasingly regulated through the technology of subjectivity and a rivalrous fulfilment of the self, whereby work is the chief instrument through which this is accomplished (Dardot & Laval, 2014, p. 260). Also reflecting on the dynamics of post-Fordist work, Cox and Federici (1976) conclude that “we [emphasis added] have always belonged to capital every moment of our lives” (p. 12). Thus, the arranging of these ideas led to understanding “work as a path to individual self-expression, self-development and creativity” (Weeks, 2011, p. 46); and, conversely, subjectivity as the essential mechanism of work, since it is what bonds humans with the capitalist productive and ideological apparatus (Hoyos Lozano & Muñoz Restrepo, 2018).

Here, the interest shifts from the individual’s productive behaviour to the entirety of its conduct (Bröckling, 2015, p. 21; Townley, 1989, p. 106). Therefore, every aspect of the subject is now perceived in productive terms and managed through capitalist frames. The psychological, as opposed to the physical, enters the economic terrain, thus giving the impression that ‘loving one’s job’ is an implicit task of the work. In fact, striving to love one’s job is one of the best ways to accomplish this mission (Hochschild, 1983, p. 6). What has been called the “panopticon introjection”⁴ (Bröckling, 2015, p. 240) also contributed to making “work [a sort of] mechanism of spiritual independence: rather than relying upon religious institutions and authorities, ‘the conscientious Puritan continually supervised his own state of grace’” (Weber, 1958, p. 124). In this line, Weeks (2011) continues to explain:

The crude subjectification of Taylor’s Schmidt is guided now by a myriad of management theories and a major industry that aids in the manufacture of productive corporate cultures: the relatively simple industrial psychology of the Fordist era had been remade into the complex art of cultural fashioning and emotional engineering typical of many managerial regimes today. The problem for many employers is one of encouraging employee self-development. (p. 71)

Consequently, these new working subjects (Bröckling, 2015), echoing the Nietzschean duality of the self, are expected to play two conjoinedly ambivalent roles: that of the master and the mastered. The mantra ‘be yourself’ that has conquered almost every social discourse has, as Lazzarato states, “far from eliminating, the antagonism between hierarchy and cooperation, between autonomy and command, actually resides at a higher level” (1996, p. 135). Working subjects are no longer limited to producing commodities and providing services—indeed, they are no longer limited to producing themselves as working subjects. Instead, they now must produce themselves as consumers and neoliberal subjects, thereby revealing subjectivity as a foundation of contemporary work.

⁴ This is a concept drawing from Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, a prison architecture and surveillance technique he developed in the 18th century (White & Epston, 1993, p. 80), and its Foucauldian (2019) analysis on Discipline and Punish (p. 341). As Bentham conceived it, a panopticon is a ring-shaped building of individualized cells with a surveillance tower at the center, in its inner courtyard (White & Epston, 1993, p. 80). It provides a structure for an asymmetrical application of power under the premise that “power should be visible and unverifiable” (Foucault, 2019, p. 344). When power is unverifiable and, thus, immaterial, it coerces people into self-surveillance, prompting them to assume an active role in their own subjugation (White & Epston, 1993, p. 83). Thus, the ‘panopticon introjection’ points to achieving self-subjugation without the mediation of a physical panopticon.
The critique of Weeks

As Weeks (2011) defines it, the practice of demanding requires a “personal investment”, a “passionate attachment”, and “the presence of a desiring subject” (p. 134). From this and her statement that “it is ‘we’ or ‘I’ who makes a demand” (p. 134), it is clear that demands require a demanding subject, which exposes the inconsistency in her argumentation that I want to unveil. The ways out of the current problems of work that she envisions are not critical enough of subjectivity. Nor does she problematize them to the extent that is required to provide a sufficiently detailed picture of the problems of work that trouble her – and which she in turn troubles.

This issue is not only represented by Weeks’ (2011) demanding subject, but also in how she presents the (visionary) advantages and positive effects of what is being demanded as subjective gains. The reader repetitiously encounters this idea. For instance, when examining the proposal of the refusal of work, she puts it as one that “is at once deconstructive and reconstructive—or, as the autonomists might describe it, a practice of separation and process of self‐valorization [emphasis added]—an analysis that is committed at once to antework critique and post‐work invention” (p. 32). Moreover, she poses that “the demand for shorter hours is conceived here as a demand for, among other benefits, more time to imagine, experiment with, and participate in the relationship of intimacy and sociality that we choose” (p. 34). The idea also reappears when Weeks refers to the shaping values of work. She writes:

to call this traditional work values into question is not to claim that work is without value…It is, rather, to…suggest there might be a variety of ways to experience the pleasure that we may now find in work, as well as other pleasures that we may wish to discover, cultivate, and enjoy (p. 12).

To cite another example:

We might demand a basic income not so that we can have, do, or be what we already want, do, or are, but because it might allow us to consider and experiment with different kinds of lives, with wanting, doing, and being, otherwise [emphasis added] (p. 145).

In the above two quotes, the advantage is measured in terms of pleasure, which is contradictory enough, as it alludes to a produced and self‐produced subject who aims for personal (subjective) satisfaction. Nevertheless, the final quote is possibly the most problematic, for the author is defending subjective wills and desires and suggesting reterritorializing the wishful subject. Given that, in contemporary work relations, subjects are urged to discipline and produce themselves, and the limit between working and being a subject is diffused, I am convinced that ‘being otherwise’ does not change anything or make our current reality better. On the contrary, subjectivity or sheer being, is what capitalism needs to keep going (particularly in its current form of neoliberalism). In this sense, the question for inciting a post‐work world and overthrowing subjectivity is not one that might consider alternative subjectivities.

The tension under scrutiny arises in the middle chapters of Weeks’ (2011) book, when she exposes why the purposed changes are desirable. This is upsetting because, earlier, she seemed to be adequately aware of the complexities and paradoxes between subjectivity and post‐Fordist work. The author even affirms that “the demand for basic income attempts to address—rather than continuing to ignore or deny—the realities of post‐Fordist work, to offer a measure of security in an economy of precariousness” (p. 150). However, the role and limits of subjectivity, which is perhaps the instituting reality of post‐Fordist work, are left unabated. Fittingly, her last claim is undermined by the necessity of the implicit—sometimes explicit—subject in demand and her acknowledgement that “understanding and confronting the contemporary work society requires attention to both its structures
and its subjectivities” (p. 40).

Because ‘the demand’ is the grounding aspect of not just Weeks’ but also Williams and Srnicek’s project, the critique I am trying to establish here could apply to both texts equally. That said, I am by no means suggesting that the above three authors must be dismissed. On the contrary, my efforts are evidence of my great appreciation for their intellectual developments, but the role of subjectivity in neoliberal formations is a complexity that requires deeper consideration in their works to make their valuable contributions and alternative life modalities sturdier. As I have observed above and elsewhere (Hoyos Lozano & Muñoz Restrepo, 2018), the problems that the world of work now poses are only solvable when considered in conjunction with those of subjectivity. This, to say the least, calls into question a post-work society intended for the subject.

**Raving in paradox**

There is symmetry in how Weeks (2011) resists addressing the disclosed tension and how Algorave disregards subjectivity. Reeve (2016), who is a British live artist and philosopher, notes that regardless of the “habitual subjectivity surrounding the practice [of live coding] as a whole [it] remains unaffected by the creative work generated and experienced” (p. 159). Implying that Algorave is yet to develop a posture concerning subjectivity, she proposes that “the challenge from live art to live coding is to ask in what ways the latter practice negotiates critical subjectivity and how this might affect the scope of what can get done via it?” (p. 158). As far as I am aware, Algorave’s members’ participation in the artistic-political debate around automatization and work has not pondered subjectivity’s role. This is a missed opportunity given their “incredibly strong position to create new forms of cultural experience which might transform human self-understanding in relationship to the phenomenal world as well as inspire the technological imaginary” (p. 160). In this way, Algorave’s critical discourse’s inattention to the frictions involving subjectivity mirrors Weeks’ avoidance to recognize the contradiction between the alternatives she suggests and their aim to introduce the human possibility of ‘being otherwise’. In my opinion, these issues are more worrisome than their failure to resolve such contradiction or postulate a comprehensive resolution to the problem that subjectivity represents.

As with (any) other artistic or political avenues, Algorave remains trapped in the negotiation between what is being communicated, expressed, and defended (or demanded) and the unavoidability of doing so from a subjective stance. More troubling, however, is how the, otherwise radical, reduction of the working week or implementation of a UBI could bolster subjectivity via Weeks’ (2011) celebration of having more time to imagine and experiment (p. 34), discover, cultivate, and enjoy (p. 12); specifically, in a creative milieu like Algorave.

Following Reeve’s (2016) “insistence on an ethical-artistic justification for performing in public” (p. 158), and, to answer her question of “why should live code performances take place?” (p. 157), a rationale I propose is to continue to use Algorave’s political nature—which is made clear in their interest that people understand how algorithms operate—to diminish the impact of the difficulties examined in this article. Through the encouragement to culturally adapt an analytical lens on algorithms, it would be much easier to realize what is being injected into them and hence, be allowed to pass on to the post-human terrain.

Reeve (2016) outlines the heart of the problem when asserting that “the recognition that we have entered the posthuman realm does not mean that subjectivity has disappeared or become inoperative” (p. 158). However, based on my conception of post-humanism, this should indeed be the case. Anything that has been naturalized—like genderism, work, or subjectivity—risks being relocated into an automatized future and perpetuated, as coders will not necessarily be aware of the normative constructs being interwoven into their input. Algorave could
operate as a platform to denounce such risk, understanding that, due to their intimate relationship, a questioning or critique directed at the dynamics in which subjectivity participates will unavoidably imply a critique of work (and vice versa). Further, an artistic statement against subjectivity could be reinforced via meta-automation—standalone automations performed by previously programmed automations, which are not directly humanly generated and therefore not straightforwardly subjective—and an exacerbation of collaborative composition methods. Nonetheless, these artistic approaches to problematize subjectivity would still have a long way to make possible an unambiguous reference to its overthrowing, transcendence, or dissolution.

This then begs the question: is the problem of dissolving subjectivity a dead end? Being possibly one of today’s most timely and relevant questions, it constitutes a paradox, for we can only approach the question through our own subjectivities. As Reeve (2016) claims: “to disavow subjectivity is still a quasi-act of subjectivity” (p. 158). That said, a complementary but still partial way to tackle this interrogation could be through the live artist’s understanding of Deleuze and Guattari’s body without organs (BwO), in which “the self does not disappear but loses its traditional modus operandi as an organizing principle and instead becomes an appendix, a residium, to a BwO” (p. 155). At least here, the self, and therefore subjectivity, can start to lose its centrality and some of its power. In the setting of Algorave, this alternative seems to be especially pertinent, at least according to Reeve’s examination. Because of the vast role of automation and randomization, the artist’s subjectivity participates as an ingredient rather than a supreme entity with all elements of the performance under control. Consequently, and in agreement with a (non-humanist) post-humanist standpoint, the subjectivities in the audience are not—and cannot be—conceived as supreme queens or judges who must be pleased, as not every element of the performance is envisioned for their enjoyment.

**Conclusion**

My analysis has revealed how Algorave wholly engages two aspects of Srnicek and Williams's (2016) post-work society: automation and the diminishment of the work ethic. Although the remaining two aspects—the reduction of the working week and the implementation of a UBI—seem to have not been collectively addressed by Algorave, I explained how the collective could relate and benefit from them. Both policies could translate into treasured resources supporting the community’s free work, open-source practices, and overall political vision.

Regarding the critique of Weeks’ treatment of the concept of subjectivity in relation to work, I forewarned that the act of ‘demanding’ operates through subjectivity, and similarly, problematized the author’s justification of post-work proposals and devices based on subjective gains. Acknowledging the shared history of work and subjectivity, I argued that the developed contradictions assist the reterritorialization of the subject and must be overcome if we expect post-work to leave behind one of the major issues of neoliberal work. In sum, this was the route I followed to challenge a post-work society that is still indebted to the subject.

My suggested paths forward for Algorave are threefold. First, and perhaps the most important, is to deploy and bolster the community’s scrutinizing optic on algorithms by deliberately emphasizing currently normalized and naturalized social constructs, which are already exceedingly problematic, such as gender, work, and subjectivity. This focus could be taken as an additional political power within, and from, Algorave to monitor the influence that current societies are potentially having on future societies via algorithmic technologies. The second recommendation, yet merely with the status of an artistic statement, is the intensification of meta-automation techniques and collaborative composition methods. Third, and closely linked to the previous suggestion, is to concede that, in live code performances, and because of the immense role of automation and randomization, (the artist’s) subjectivity is prone to—and
should—lose its customary centrality and power. This is meaningful to consider how automation is effective to displace subjectivity’s role in other social environments and societies at large.

Based on Algorave politics, I revealed how the community harnesses a power capable of defying and even altering political, economic, ideological, and ethical structures, like those of work and subjectivity. This power would probably upsurge if they recognized that some of their practices are in line with the construction of a post-work community and devoted to the opportunities of development that I have signaled here. Also, if, in responding to Reeve’s (2016) call, they committed to a conscious critical subjectivity praxis, invigorating their confrontation to subjectivity, and therefore, the instituting reality of post-Fordist work, they could further their political power even more. In the same vein, the feminization of Algorave’s coding language and musical narratives is also central when attending to the subversion of political, ideological, and ethical structures.

In response to the proposals to refuse and reduce work as it relates to post-work societies, I can conclude that less work must entail less subjectivity. While it is understandable that transitioning to a post-work society requires some degree of subjectivity, a consummate post-work society is, in my understanding, not possible without eventually overthrowing subjectivity altogether (whether in my terms or not). Rephrasing Judith Butler, Reeve (2016) “contends that critique as a practice is not something that can be voluntarily adopted, it results from ‘subject positions’ that are made ‘unlivable’ and thus start to expose the contingencies that made them possible in the first place” (p. 160). But—with the most minimum desire of waning the struggle of those who are greatly oppressed—is the unlivable subject position not that of the subject itself? In light of my analysis, I recognize that the subject of automation is the automated subject. Therefore, I ask the advocators of automation for caution because if automation manages to make subjectivity part of algorithms with governmental impact, we will be—now and for good—automatically condemned to living as subjects, significantly reinforcing the foundation of neoliberal work.
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